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International Investment Rules and 
Capital Mobility 
Considerations in Light of the Asian Financial Crisis 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis a number of questions related to free movement 
of capital are being reconsidered. Is it desirable to have full capital mobility for emerging 
market economies? Will capital account liberalisation lead to a growing number of 
financial crises which will threaten the stability of the international financial system? 
T he international institutional architecture, which was designed to deal with the post world war two 
economic situation, has become outmoded. The legal 
framework governing international trade, which was 
established under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATE), has been revised and expanded 
under the new World Trade Organisation (WTO). But it 
has no comprehensive set of rules for multinational 
corporations (MNCs) which are major locomotives of 
investment in the global economy. The founding 
charter of the International Monetary fund (IMF) did 
not equip the organisation to deal with the enormous 
private capital flows which have grown in the global 
economy since the 1980s as portfolio investment 
flows and international bank lending have increased 
dramatically. 
The existing international investment regime is a 
patchwork of numerous bilateral treaties and a 
growing number of regional and multilateral agree- 
ments. This is an unbalanced architectural structure 
based on weak foundations and multiple layers of 
overlapping and inconsistent regulations. The debate 
about international investment rules so far has 
concentrated on foreign direct investment (FDI). This 
type of investment is increasingly considered to be an 
alternative mode to traditional exporting as a means 
for companies to service foreign markets. Conse- 
quently, the well know principles, which have been 
used for the liberalisation of trade, are now being 
applied to FDI. 1 
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But foreign investment is more complex than 
foreign trade because investment requires capital 
mobility as well as market access. Therefore, a com- 
prehensive set of rules for foreign investment must 
cover both the trade and finance related aspects of 
investment. This implies the need for joint implemen- 
tation of rules between the international institutions 
with competence in matters of trade and finance. 
Furthermore, the process of establishing multilateral 
rules based on the codification of best existing 
practices currently embodied in bilateral investment 
treaties and in regional economic agreements is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the estab- 
lishment of a strong and credible legal framework for 
global investment. Of equal importance is the 
restructuring of the competences of existing inter- 
national organisations to ensure consistency between 
the two sets of rules governing international trade and 
finance. 
A future multilateral agreement on investment 
(MAI), which is expected to be negotiated in the WTO, 
will need to establish a coherent set of rules for the 
liberalisation of 'full investment'. 2 The scope of the 
See the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Consolidated Text 
and Commentary, OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and 
Enterprise Affairs Negotiating Group on the MAI, Paris 1997. 
2 For the EU position on multilateral investment rules in the W-IO, see  
European Commission: A Level Playing Field for Direct Investment 
World Wide, Office for Official Publications of the European Com- 
munities, Luxembourg 1995. For the position of the developing 
countries see A.V. Ganesan:  Strategic Options available to 
Developing Countries with regard to a Multilateral Agreement on In- 
vestment, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), Discussion Paper No. 134, Geneva 1998. 
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agreement should go beyond FDI to include portfolio 
investment including stocks and bonds, and debt 
capital including bank lending. Such an agreement is 
necessary because the different channels through 
which capital flows internationally have now become 
integrated to such an extent that a sectoral agreement 
for FDI alone would not only be discriminatory but 
also infeasible from the point of view of its adminis- 
tration. 
A multilateral agreement which seeks to liberalise 
'full investment' would require complete liberalisation 
of the capital account of the balance of payments, in 
other words complete freedom of capital movement. 
For the industrialised countries, this has already been 
largely achieved as their financial markets have 
become increasingly integrated since the 1980s. In 
emerging markets the liberalisation of capital markets 
has gathered momentum since the 1990s. This has 
been accompanied by - and perhaps also motivated 
by -increasing discussion in academic and policy- 
making forums on the need for financial liberalisation 
as an instrument of economic growth in these 
countries? 
But in the wake of the Asian financial crisis a 
number of questions related to free movement of 
capital are being reconsidered. Is it desirable to have 
full capital mobility for emerging market economies? 
Will capital account liberalisation lead to a growing 
number of financial crises which will threaten the 
stability of the international financial system? There is, 
therefore, need for careful consideration of how 
investment rules should deal with capital mobility. 
This paper will focus on investment rules and 
capital mobility and the implications for the stability of 
the international financial system. First, we shall 
analyse the growing links between the three major 
categories of private capital flows in the global 
economy. We shall then present an analysis of the 
main features of the Asian financial crisis and examine 
the issues concerning investment and capital flows 
which have emanated from this crisis. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the existing institutional 
arrangements for the liberalisation of capital move- 
3 For an overview of the literature on the links between the financial 
system and economic growth see M. G e r t l e r: Financial Structure 
and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview, in: Journal of Money, 
Banking and Credit, 20, 1998, Part 2, pp. 559-88. For a discussion of 
financial development see R. Kin g, R. Levi n e : Financial Inter- 
mediation and Economic Development in: C. Mayer, X. Vives 
(eds.): Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation, Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press, Cambridge 1993. 
4 International Monetary Fund: Balance of Payments Manual, 5th Edi- 
tion, Washington D.C. 1993. 
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ments. Finally we shall discuss how future negotia- 
tions for investment liberalisation present an 
opportunity which should be used to strengthen the 
architecture of the international financial system. 
International Investment and Capital Flows 
Foreign investment requires capital mobility, pri- 
marily in equity and debt, across national frontiers. 
Capital flows in the global economy are comprised of 
three major categories, direct equity investment, port- 
folio equity investment and international bank lending. 
As will be shown below, the boundaries between 
these three categories have become increasingly 
blurred. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The conventional distinction between foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment 
hinges on whether the foreign investor can exercise 
control over managerial decisions of the business. In 
the standard definition of FDI given by the IMF, direct 
investment is made to acquire a 'lasting interest' in an 
enterprise operating in a foreign country and the 
investor's purpose is to have 'an effective voice in the 
management of the enterprise'? 
The investing firm acquires an effective voice or 
control in management by owning a certain equity 
capital stake. It is considered by the IMF that a stake 
of 10 per cent of the ordinary shares or voting power 
is the threshold for achieving control. However, not all 
countries follow IMF guidelines. There are substantial 
differences between countries' definitions of control. 
Some countries, such as Germany, define 20 per cent 
of share ownership or higher as the threshold for 
control. Therefore, the boundary between direct and 
portfolio investment is somewhat arbitrary. A further 
grey area is found in the measurement of FDI. 
FDI flows are recorded in the IMF balance of 
payments statistics as long-term capital outflows and 
inflows between the parent enterprise in the home 
country and the foreign affiliates which it controls in 
the host country. According to this approach FDI is 
comprised of three components: foreign investor's 
initial equity capital, subsequent reinvested earnings 
and intra-company loans and debt transactions 
between the parent and foreign affiliate enterprises. 
Only internal sources of funds for financing FDI are 
recorded. 
The problem with this method of accounting is that 
it excludes external sources of funds for financing 
FDI. Foreign affiliates can finance their investment by 
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borrowing from local or international enders, or can 
raise funds in the domestic or international capital 
markets. They can also raise equity capital from local 
and international minority shareholders if the foreign 
parent does not hold 100 per cent ownership. 5 
Multinational Corporations and Debt Finance 
Multinational corporations are considered as a form 
of international equity finance but they are also a 
vehicle for international debt finance. In fact, they 
have acted as a catalyst for the unprecedented 
growth of private bank lending since the 1960s 
through the development of interbank lending. It was 
the growth of multinational corporations which led to 
the parallel growth of multinational banking in the 
global economy. 
Multinational banking concerns the ownership of 
banking facilities in the economy of one country by 
residents in a foreign country. The initial motivation for 
the emergence of multinational banks was the 
'defensive' strategy of following their corporate clients 
abroad for fear of losing their business to local banks 
in the foreign market. But the early practice of 
multinational service banking rapidly evolved into 
multinational wholesale banking. ~ 
This has created a global network for international 
capital flows which represents the equivalent of a 
global federal funds market. It is the multinational 
wholsale banking network which has become the 
main conduit for international capital flows through its 
large volume of interbank lending. Multinational banks 
may increase the efficiency of international capital 
flows and if this is so they will be welfare increasing. 
But if distortions exist in domestic capital markets, 
then international capital flows may have harmful 
effects on countries. 
Foreign Portfolio Investment 
The growth of foreign portfolio investment flows 
since the 1980s reflects the growing importance of 
new investors such as pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment funds on global financial 
5 See E. M Graham:  Foreign Direct Investment in the World 
Economy, IMF Working Paper, Washington D.C. 1995. 
6 For the theory of multinational banks see H. G r u b e I : A Theory of 
Multinational Banking, in: Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review, No. 123, 1977, pp, 349-63. See also J. M. Gray,  H.P. 
Gray :  The Multinational Bank: A Financial MNC, in: Journal of 
Bankin 9 and Finance, 5, 1, 1981, pp. 33-63. 
' For an analysis of the role of portfolio investment in emerging 
markets, and the links between portfolio and direct investment, see 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): 
Wold investment Report, Geneva 1997. 
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markets. Flows of portfolio investment normally take 
place through transactions involving shares of 
companies quoted on stock markets. But they can 
also take place through flows of finance to unquoted 
companies via venture capitalists. Portfolio capital 
inflows contribute directly to the financing of domestic 
industry in the host country when the investment is 
made for primary issues on the local stock market or 
in international markets through equity offerings or 
issues of depository receipts. Portfolio capital inflows 
can also be used for share purchases in the local 
secondary market. The latter indirectly finances local 
firms by pushing up the price of equity and thereby 
lowering the cost of capital in the stock market and 
consequently encouraging new issues. This will 
upgrade the domestic private sector and, thereby, 
also make the country more attractive to foreign direct 
investors. 7 
Concern over portfolio investment flows is 
motivated by the more short-term, speculative nature 
Table 1 
Capital Flows and Reserves in Asia 
and Latin America 
(in billions of US dollars, at annual rates) 
1980-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total 
China 
Other Asia ~ 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Other Latin 
America 2 
Total 
China 
Other Asia' 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Other Latin 
America 2 
Total 
China 
Other Asia' 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Other Latin 
America 2 
Net private capital inflows 
12.9 52.5 81.3 99.1 78.7 77.7 149.8 
1.9' -1.9 11.7 7.8 14.6 13.9 23.0 
4.7 26.2 19.3 34.0 26.8 37.6 56.8 
3.8 2.5 9.1 9.9 9.1 31.8 35.4 
1.6 20.6 23.6 30.3 10.3 -13.2 13.5 
0.8 5.0 17.6 17.0 18.0 7.6 21.1 
Net official capital inflows 
13.8 12.8 19.8 13.2 13.8 33.8 0.9 
1.2' 2.9 5.4 5.6 9.3 6.9 7.0 
6.8 8.3 13.3 5.7 3.7 1.9 3.8 
1.0 -1.4 -0,5 -1.2 -0.7 -0.7 -1.8 
2.1 2.4 2.0 -0.9 0.3 24.5 -10.0 
2.7 0.6 -0.4 3.9 1.2 1.1 1.8 
Net increase in reserves 
13.3 55.5 71.4 59.2 48.5 62.6 83.2 
2.7" 14.1 23.2 1.8 30.5 22.5 31.4 
10.5 25.2 25.7 37.1 23.8 16.2 25.8 
-O.1 -0.4 14~7 8,7 7.2 12,9 9.3 
0.6 8.2 1.2 6.1 -18.9 10.7 1.8 
-0.4 8.4 6.6 5.5 5.9 0.4 14.9 
Note: Capital flows are calculated as the difference between the 
current account and the the change in reserves; private flows are 
calcualted as a residual from an estimate of official flows. 
a 1982-90. 
' India, Indonesia. Korea, Malaysia, Phitippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand. 
2 Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Peru, Venezuela. 
Source :  BIS 67th Annual Report (1997), p. 99; IMF Balance of 
Payments Statistics and Institute of ~nternatfonal Finance. 
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Table 2 
Bank Credit Expansion and Indicators of the Banking Industry in Asian countries 
Bank credit o the private sector ~ Indicators of the banking industry 
Annual rate of As a percentage Operating Net interest margin 
expansion 2 of GDP costs 
1981-89 1990-97 a 1997 1990-94 1995-96 1990-94 1995-96 
China 3 12 13 97 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.2 
Hong Kong 13 8 157 0.1 ~ 0.4 0.2' 0.3 
Taiwan 15 13 138 1.3 1.3 2.1 2.2 
Indonesia 22 18 57 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.6 
Korea 13 12 64 1.9 c 2.1 2.2 ~ 2.2 
Malaysia 11 16 95 1.6 ~ 1.4 4.7 ~ 3.2 
Philippines -5 18 52 4.0 3.5 5.3 4.8 
Singapore 10 12 97 0.8 0.7 2.2 2.0 
Thailand 15 18 105 1.9 1.8 3.6 3.6 
Memo items: 
United States 5 0.5 65 3.7 3.4 4.1 3.8 
Japan 8 1.5 111 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
G-10 Europe' 6 4 89 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.0 
a 1997 data are preliminary, b1993-94. ~ 1991-94. 
Annual average. 2 Deflated by consumer prices. 3 Credit other than to central government. ' Weighted average based on 1990 GDP and PPP 
Exchange rates. 
Source: BIS 68th Annual Report (1998), p. 119. 
of such investment compared to direct investment 
which is considered to be long term and stabilising. In 
practice, however, the distinction is not so clearcut. 
Portfolio investment by institutional investors such as 
pension funds is frequently long term although they 
do not exercise any managerial control. Similarly, 
venture capital investors often keep their equity stake 
in start-up companies for several years and, in 
addition, provide advisory services. Foreign investors 
are not inherently more oriented towards short-term 
speculation than domestic investors. The problem is 
frequently at a more fundamental evel where capital 
inflows are used to finance large current accounts 
which are unsustainable and, therefore, signal the 
need for adjustment. Foreign portfolio investors, 
becuase their investments are relatively liquid, will 
move quickly as soon as they sense trouble. But the 
first best policy in this case is sound macroeconomic 
policies. If governments resort to capital controls this 
may only serve to distract the authorities from 
maintaining sound monetary and fiscal policies. 
Capital controls may also reduce inflows of FDI as the 
evidence shows a positive relationship between FDI 
and FPEI (foreign portfolio equity investment) in both 
industrial and emerging market economies. 8
8 See J. Tatom: Portfolio Flows do not Suggest Risk, in: UBS 
International Finance, Issue 26, 1996, pp. 9-13. 
This section draws from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) Annual Report, 1997, Ch VI, Financial trends in emerging 
markets, pp. 97-117, and BIS Annual Report, 1998, Ch. VII, Financial 
intermediation in the Asian crisis, pp. 117-141. 
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The Asian Financial Crisis 
During the 1990s there was an unprecedented 
build-up of capital inflows into the emerging markets 
of Asia. The volume of capital flowing into these coun- 
tries, which previous to then had been moderate, was 
predominantly private capital? Table 1 shows the 
increase in private capital inflows and accumulation of 
reserves which were far in excess of official capital 
inflows. 
The structure of external financing reveals how 
these countries were gradually becoming more 
dependent on short-term capital inflows. 
Foreign Bank Lending and 
Domestic Credit Expansion 
There was increasing reliance on international bank 
and bond finance. Inter bank lending was particularly 
important. Furthermore the loans were increasingly 
short-term and denominated in a foreign currency. 
Almost 60 per cent of total lending was denominated 
in dollars and the remainder mainly in yen; two thirds 
of all loans had a maturity of less than one year. 
European banks were relatively latecomers to the 
Asian lending boom but they accounted for more than 
half of the lending to this group of countries between 
1995 and mid-1997. 
Massive expansion of credit in the domestic 
economy provided the backdrop to the large foreign 
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borrowing. Bank credit grew by more than 10 per cent 
a year in real terms during the 1990s and in several 
countries it was almost double that. Table 2 shows the 
ratio of bank credit to GDP and the increasing fragility 
of the banking industry. 
The vulnerability of the banks is indicated by the 
extremely slim margin between the net interest and 
their operating costs. This indicates that little or no 
provisions were being made to provide a cushion 
against risk. This was imprudent at a time when the 
financial sector was being deregulated and, conse- 
quently, facing new and increasing competition from 
both domestic and foreign banks. But as optimism 
about the future growth prospects of the whole Asian 
region continued to ride high - which was based on 
consistently good performance in the past - other 
economic agents as well as the banks underestimat- 
ed the risks of over investing. 
Even the credit-rating agencies failed to observe 
the mounting risk. Despite the availability of infor- 
mation concerning widening current account deficits 
and increasing short-term external indebtedness, the 
rating agencies did not downgrade these countries in 
terms of risk assessment of long-term foreign 
currency debt. In fact they continued to upgrade them 
throughout 1995 and 1996. It was only after the crisis 
broke that they reacted. They then slashed the credit 
rating of these countries which had extremely painful 
economic consequences. 
Foreign Portfolio Equity Investment 
The remarkable development of portfolio equity 
markets in Asian countries in the 1990s was reflected 
in the ratio of capitalisation to GDP, which in Asian 
countries had become comparable to those in the 
larger European countries, or in Japan. However, the 
volatility of equity prices in Asian countries continued 
to be much higher than in industrialised countries. 
This is shown in Table 3. 
It was equity markets which gave the first signal of 
trouble. Stock markets in most Asian countries (with 
the exception of China and Hong Kong) peaked 
towards the end of 1993. And the marked declines 
thereafter suggest that investors had already begun to 
expect lower profitability from Asian companies. 
Equities are much more sensitive to changes in 
profitability than bonds or bank loans. One good 
reason for this may be that financial bail-outs rarely 
make good the losses suffered by portfolio investors 
when there is a financial crisis. Thus the portfolio 
equity investors were the first to show awareness of 
the vulnerability of the Asian economies. 
Table 3 
Equity Markets in Asia: 
Capitalisation and Volatility 
Capitalisation' Volatility 2 
1990 1996 1993-94 1995-96 
China 0.5 a 13.8 26.6 10.5 
Hong Kong 111.5 280.8 10.1 5.5 
Korea 43.6 25.4 6.1 6.1 
Singapore 91.6 169.0 3.9 3.1 
Taiwan 62.7 100.5 13.9 8.5 
Indonesia 7.1 41.2 8.9 7.3 
Malaysia 113.6 315.5 9.0 5.8 
Philippines 13.4 97.5 10.2 6.4 
Thailand 28.0 54.4 11.0 7.7 
Memorandum items: 
United States 53.8 108.7 1.4 2.0 
Japan 98.2 67.6 6.0 3.4 
Germany 23.6 29.4 3.2 1.7 
United Kingdom 86.7 151.0 4.2 2.5 
Other G-10 Europe 3 26.9 47.8 4.7 3.8 
a 1991.  
, As a percentage of GDP. 2 Standard deviation of monthly changes 
over the periods January 1993 to November 1994 and January 1995 
to November 1996 (to exclude the crisis-affected months of the Mexi- 
can crisis in December 1994). 3 Weighted average based on 1990 
GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
Source :  BIS 67th Annual Report (1997), p. 105. 
The Reversal of Capital Inflows 
The Asian crisis broke as the enormous inflows of 
capital suddenly changed to capital outflows in the 
latter half of 1997. It was the short-term capital inflows 
which had been channeled through the banks and the 
portfolio investors which were reversed in contrast to 
direct equity investment which remained relatively 
stable. Table 4 shows the extent of the capital out- 
flows. 
The Asian financial crisis was linked with the 
reversal of capital inflows; however it was not capital 
flows per se which caused the crisis. The capital 
inflows were used to finance current account deficits 
which had been progressively widening in the region. 
In the early 1990s they were far larger than in the 
1980s. Between 1985-89 the current account deficits 
averaged just 0.3 per cent of GDP in the five Asian 
countries at the centre of the crisis. But between 
1990-96 the current account deficits averaged 4.0 per 
cent of GDP in most countries and they were rising? ~ 
,0 j .  Sachs ,  S. Rade le t :  Onset of the East Asian Financial 
Crisis, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 1998. 
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Table 4 
External Financing in five Asian Economies 1 
(in billions of dollars) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 ~ 1998' 
Current account 
balance -24.6 -41.3 -54.9 -26.0 17.6 
Net external financing 47.4 80.9 92.8 15.2 15.2 
Net Private Flows 40.5 77.4 93.0 -12.1 -9.4 
Equity Investment 12.2 15.5 19.1 -4.5 7.9 
Direct Equity 4.7 4.9 7.0 7.2 9.8 
Portfolio equity 7.6 10.6 12.1 -11.6 -1.9 
Private Creditors 28.2 61.8 74.0 -7.6 -17.3 
Commercial Banks 24.0 49.5 55.5 -21.3 -14.1 
Non-bank private 
creditors 4.2 12.4 18.4 13.7 -3.2 
Net Official Flows 7.0 3.6 -0.2 27.2 24.6 
International 
financial institutions -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 23.0 18.5 
Bilateral creditors 17.4 4.2 0.7 4.3 6.1 
Net other residual 
lending 2 -17.5 -25.9 -19.6 -11.9 -5.7 
Reserves excl. gold 
(-: increase) -5.4 -13.7 -18.3 23.7 27.1 
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
2 Incl. resident net lending, monetary gold, and errors and omissions. 
" estimate; 'forecast. 
Source :  Institute of International Finance Inc,: Capital Flows to 
emerging Market Economies, January 29, 1998, cited in Jeffrey 
Sachs, Steven Radelet: The Onset of the East and Asian Financial 
Crisis, Brookings Institution, Washington D. C. 
The over-financing of such deficits was imprudent as 
it only served to detract the policy makers from 
diagnosing the true nature of the balance of payments 
disequilibrium. 
But it cannot be denied that the sudden reversal of 
capital inflows amplified the balance of payments 
crises. In order to counteract capital flight these coun- 
tries had to do everything to get capital to return. 
Therefore, as advocated by the International Monet- 
ary Fund they raised their interest rates. This further 
exacerbated the situation as it led to highly leveraged 
companies in the real sector going bankrupt which, in 
turn led to banks becoming insolvent. In addition 
there was a 'fire-sale' of assets to foreigners as many 
domestic assets were under-valued and had to be 
sold cheaply. All of this explains why issues surround- 
ing capital mobility in emerging markets need to be 
given greater attention in MAI negotiations than they 
have received so far. 
Issues Emanating from the Financial Crisis 
The succession of financial crises which have oc- 
curred since the 1980s is not sustainable. The Asian 
Table 5 
Official Financing Commitment 
(in billions of US dollars) 
IMF IBRD ADB Bilateral Total 
Commitments 
Thailand 3.9 1.9 2.2 12.1 20.1 
(505% of quota) 
Indonesia 10.1 4.5 3.5 22.0 40.0 
(490% of quota) 
Korea 21 10.0 4.0 22.0 57.0 
(1939% of quota) 
Total 35 16.4 9.7 56.1 117.1 
Memo item: 
Mexico 17.8 1.5 1.3 21.0 a 51.6 
(689% of quota) 
a In addition there was a credit facility of up to 10 billion dollars with 
G-10 central banks, which was never activated. 
Source :  BIS 68th Annual Report (1998), p. 134. 
financial crisis, which has been the most serious one 
to date, raised a number of important policy issues. 
The Role of the IMF 
The first and most immediate issue to emerge was 
the management of the financial crisis by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund through provision of massive 
official liquidity assistance. The rescue package com- 
prised IMF standby credits, which were extremely 
large relative to the countries' IMF quotas, comple- 
mented by substantial credits from the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank as well as bilateral 
assistance from the G-10 countries. 11 Table 5 shows 
the size of the official capital assistance made 
available for management of the crisis. 
Considerable controversy has surrounded the IMF 
activity. Should the IMF provide financing for member 
countries faced with balance of payments crisis which 
have their source in the capital account? Under the 
original Articles of Agreement, Article VI, Section 1 
specifies that IMF resources may not be used to 
"meet a large or sustained outflow of capital". But 
already in the 1960s this rule had to be modified to 
cope with flows of short-term speculative capital. The 
amendment of the Fund's Articles of Agreement to 
include the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) 
has led to the G-10 countries having to continually 
augment resources available for the management of 
financial crises which could not be handled by a 
country's reserves and IMF quota. The G-10 countries 
~ The G-10 countries include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
and Switzerland and Luxembourg are closely connected. 
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recently reached an agreement with other countries to 
augment the GAB, supplementing it with a second 
facility of equal size, the so-called New Arrangements 
to Borrow (NAB)? 2 It is inevitable that some degree of 
protection is afforded to creditor banks in the event of 
such a financial bail-out. Hence, the main criticism 
aimed at the IMF activity is that it is increasing moral 
hazard and thereby sowing the seeds for further 
financial crises. In order to minimise moral hazard in 
the future, there will be need for stricter regulation and 
supervision of banks. In addition, private creditors 
should bear a part of the burden of dealing with 
financial crises as suggested by the Finance Ministers 
of the G-7 countries in 1998.13 
Financial Liberalisation and Banking Supervision 
A second major issue to emanate from the crisis 
concerns financial liberalisation, the soundness of 
banks and the stability of the international financial 
system. Banks are at the centre of the international 
,2  B. Eichengreen, R. Portes: Managing Financial Crises in 
Emerging Markets, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., April 
1998. 
,s This was proposed in the communique of G-7 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors, following their meeting on February 21, 
1998. 
financial system because they operate the inter- 
national payments mechanism and they also provide 
a broad range of financial services. In emerging 
markets they are the primary financial actors as they 
account for 80 per cent of all financial intermediation. 
The transition from a heavily regulated to a more or 
less competitive financial system - if it is to prevent 
shocks to the system - needs to be conducted 
according to the principles of progressive liberali- 
sation. The classic sequencing of financial sector re- 
forms advocates that internal liberalisation should 
precede external liberalisation. Internal liberalisation 
comprises four elements: 
[] liberalisation of interest rates; elimination of 
selective credit controls; 
[]  development of financial markets and money mar- 
kets including the interbank and treasury bill markets; 
[] strengthening of prudential regulation and super- 
vision of banks; restructuring/liquidation of unsound 
financial institutions; 
[] measures to strengthen competition in financial 
markets. TM 
Once substantial progress on internal liberalisation 
has been made and, in addition, a country has a con- 
Katrin S. Ktihnle 
Die Bindung an den Yersicherungsvertrag 
Vertragslaufzeit und Liisungsrechte im Lichte des deutschen, amerikanischen 
und europ/iischen Rechts 
Since the mid-eighties what - in Germany at all events - is frequently a very long-term bond between an 
insurance client and his policy, has been under discussion as a consumer policy problem and, even more 
often, as an aspect of competition among insurers. Meanwhile, ideas as to how the law governing insurance 
contracts could be reformed have taken on concrete shape. Ms Kiihnle starts by setting forth current 
insurance practice and its consequences. Many insurers are still working with long-term contracts as an 
important marketing component. Among insured persons, insurance contracts that often run for many 
years, constitute a considerable inroad into free disposition over their assets. In the United States, contrary 
to German legal practice, short-term insurance contracts predominate. The actual term of the contract, 
however, plays only a very secondary role because, above all else, someone who takes out insurance 
enjoys a wide range of rights regarding cancellation. In the course of a comparative l gal study which takes 
account of the handicaps for European law, our author ends her work by drawing the conclusions for 
Germany's insurance law. 
1998, 217pp., paperback, 64,- DM, 467,- 6S, 58,- sFr, ISBN 3-7890-5326-0 
(Versicherungswissenschaftliche Studien, Vol. 8) 
~ NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft 
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sistent record of macroeconomic stability, external 
financial liberalisation should take place. External 
capital flows should be liberalised first for current 
account transactions and later for capital account 
transactions. 
A major contributing factor to the Asian crisis was 
the fact that external liberalisation was advanced be- 
fore internal liberalisation had been properly imple- 
mented. Of special importance was the lack of ade- 
quate prudential regulation and supervision of banks. 
Consequently, the enormous inflows of capital took 
place against a backdrop of increasing fragility of 
domestic banking systems. A future MAI will have to 
include measures aimed at ensuring the soundness of 
banks in emerging markets. 
Restrictions on Short-term Capital Flows 
A third major issue which has emerged from the 
Asian crisis concerns the economic wisdom of capital 
account liberalisation for emerging markets. A number 
of economists have called for restrictions on short 
term capital movements, notably bank lending and 
portfolio investment. Compared to direct investment, 
portfolio equity investment is considered to be more 
volatile and destabilising as it can be liquidated and 
reversed in an extremely short period of time. Portfolio 
investors can liquidate their investment by selling their 
equity shares in secondary markets. In direct equity 
investment, companies have 'sunk costs' which imply 
the existence of exit costs and, hence, act as a 
deterrent to rapid reversal of capital inflows. The 
facility of exit in the case of portfolio equity investment 
can lead to rapid outflows of capital which can create 
havoc with an economy in a vulnerable situation. 
FDI is long-term and welfare increasing as it com- 
plements trade in goods and services. This argument 
rests on the mutual gains from trade which econo- 
mists have long demonstrated, is The evidence that 
capital mobility can be welfare increasing is much less 
solid. Dani Rodrik says on capital mobility: "We have 
no evidence that it will solve any of our problems and 
some reasons to think that it may make them 
worse". TM A future MAI will have to include safeguard 
provisions to deal with short term capital flows to 
emerging markets. 
Proponents of capital controls cite Chile as the 
model country. Chile has used capital controls to 
reduce short term capital flows and to increase FDI 
since the early 1990s. Chile has three types of con- 
trols. First it imposes a prudential tax on capital 
inflows: 30 per cent of all non-equity capital entering 
Chile must be deposited without interest earnings in 
the Central Bank. Second, Chilean banks and 
companies may raise funds on international markets 
only if two rating agencies rate their bonds as high as 
Chile's own government bonds. Third, all foreign 
capital flowing into Chile must be invested in the 
country for at least one year. This has acted as a 
deterrent to mutual funds and investment funds from 
entering Chile. ~7 
The extent and severity of the crisis calls for some 
new thinking concerning capital movements. But 
despite the Asian crisis the inescapable truth is that 
the liberalisation of investment and capital flows go 
together. Foreign investment is dependent on the free 
movement of capital; investment flows in the global 
economy will be distorted or stymied by restrictions 
on capital mobility. And the benefits from investment 
flows in today's world are sought after by almost all 
countries. 
What a future MAI must provide, therefore, is a glo- 
bal institutional framework which will maximise the 
benefits from investment and capital flows, but at the 
same time minimise the risk of financial crises. The 
MAI process to date, which has been concerned 
primarily with the liberaliation of FDI, with reliance on 
existing ancillary arrangements relating to the 
liberalisation of capital flows and financial services, 
cannot achieve this goal. The existing international 
institutional framework is fragmented. Competence 
for rule-making on matters of capital movement, 
banking and investment, is shared between a number 
of international organisations between which there is 
very limited cooperation. We shall next present an 
overview of the current situation in order to identify 
the weak links in the chain of international rules. 
The OECD Codes 
The liberalisation of capital movements among 
OECD countries began in 1961 with the adoption of 
,4 V. Ga lb is :  Sequencing of Financial Sector Reforms: A Review, 
IMF Working Paper, No. 101, Washington D.C. 1994. See also R. I. 
M c K i n n o n : The Order of Economic Liberalization, 2nd ed., Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1992. 
,5 j .  Bhagwat i :  The Capital Myth, in: Foreign Affairs, April-May 
1998. 
~6 D. Rodr ik :  Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility? in: 
Should the IMF Pursue Capital Account Convertibility?, Essays in 
International Finance, No. 207, Princeton University, 1998. 
,7 R. L a b a n, F. L a r r a i n : The Return of Private Capital to Chile in 
the 1990s: Causes, Effects and Policy Reactions, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Faculty Research Working Paper R98-02, 
Harvard University, January 1998. 
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tWO Codes: one, a Code of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements and two, a Code of Liberalisation of 
Current Invisible Operations? 8 The Code for invisibles 
covers a wide range of payments related to trade and 
investment and, in addition it covers a broad range of 
service operations. 
The capital transactions to be liberalised under the 
Code are grouped into two categories. The first cate- 
gory contains priority operations which once liberalis- 
ed cannot be restricted without reference to the 
Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible 
Transactions which considers all questions relating to 
the interpretation and implementation of the Code. 
The second category of transactions has received 
more flexible treatment. Members are free to place a 
reservation even after they have liberalised. This 
option was granted for financial transactions con- 
sidered to be quite sensitive such as foreign bond 
issues on domestic markets and inward and outward 
credit operations of domestic financial institutions. 
The first category of transactions include capital 
movements related to trade and foreign direct 
investment, while the second category of capital 
movements relate to financial transactions. 
As the importance of capital flows grew in the 
international economy the coverage of the Codes was 
expanded. With the latest revision in 1989 the OECD 
Codes now cover all capital movements and the right 
of establishment and freedom to provide banking and 
financial services. However, countries are allowed to 
take measures such as taxes or deposit requirements, 
which make international transactions more expen- 
sive, as a means of protecting their domestic financial 
institutions. 
Most OECD countries have progressively moved to 
greater liberalisation since the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
nearly all countries have made use of the safeguard 
measures to restrict capital movements at times of 
adverse monetary conditions, balance of payments 
problems and currency crises. They have been mainly 
used to stem capital outflows and in some cases 
capital inflows. The areas most frequently subject to 
reservation have been credits and loans unrelated to 
,8 See Ch. 3, Experience with Capital Account Liberalization i  
Industrial Countries, in: Capital Account Convertibility Review of 
Experience and Implications for IMF Policies, Occasional Paper 131, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., October 1995. 
~ Directive 88/361/EEC. 
2~ See The European Financial Common Market, Periodical 4/1989, 
European Documentation, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg 1989. 
trade and the issuance of foreign securities on 
domestic markets. 
The European Union Directives 
The liberalisation of capital movements has also 
been stimulated by the European Union (EU). Article 
67 of the Treaty of Rome mandated the progressive 
elimination of restrictions on the movement of capital. 
Although the first directive on capital liberalisation 
was issued in 1960, little was achieved on an 
operational evel until the 1980s when the integration 
of financial markets became a matter of policy priority. 
The liberalisation of capital in the EU proceeded in 
an analogous manner to that of the OECD, that is, in 
two stages. The first stage was concerned with 
liberalising capital movements directly related to 
trade.The second stage went beyond current account 
transactions to include all transactions of the capital 
account, including short term capital movements. The 
1988 directive established complete and uncondi- 
tional liberalisation of capital movements. 1~ The date 
for compliance was set for July 1st, 1990, but 
transitional arrangements took into consideration the 
special needs of member countries which required 
longer periods of time to prepare for full liberalisation. 
In addition, the safeguard clause provided for a 
country imposing temporary restrictions in the event 
of monetary or balance of payments turbulence 
without prior approval by the Commission. 
The liberalisation of capital movements in the EU 
was part of a broader strategy to create a financial 
common market by 1992 and to pave the way for 
monetary union at a later date. The liberalisation of 
capital was accompanied by a series of directives to 
liberalise financial services in banking, securities and 
insurance? ~ Provisions for the external iberalisation of 
capital were incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty. 
Under Article 73b all restrictions on payments and 
capital movements between member states and third 
countries were eliminated. 
Parallel to the liberalisation of capital movements 
under the OECD Codes and the EU Directives, the 
industrialised countries established minimum inter- 
national standards for the prudential regulation and 
supervision of banks. The venue for this activity was 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle. 
2, A study published by the IMF ~howed that between 1980 and 
1996, of the 181 current member countries 133 have had significant 
banking sector problem~. See C.-J. L i n d g r e n, G. G a r c i a, M.I. 
Saal: Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 1996. 
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The Bank for International Settlements 
As the liberalisation of financial sectors in industrial 
countries gathered momentum, banks were subjected 
to ever stronger competitive pressures as a result of 
which they became increasingly prone to crises. Since 
the 1980s there have been significant banking sector 
problems in countries in all parts of the world?' 
The potential threat to international financial stabi- 
lity prompted central bankers and other supervisory 
bodies to establish standards for the prudential regu- 
lation and supervision of international banks. The BIS, 
which has established a network of central bankers, 
has been at the centre of this activity? 2 The Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision was established 
as early as 1974 by the central bank governors of the 
G-10 countries to formulate guidelines for the pru- 
dential regulation and supervision of banks, tn 1983 
the Basle Committee issued the 'Basle Concordat' on 
the sharing of responsibility between countries for the 
supervision of international banking activity. 
In 1988 the Basle Accord established internation- 
ally agreed capital adequacy ratios for banks. The 
objective of this regulatory convergence was to 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the inter- 
national banking system. Furthermore, the rules 
should be applied in a consistent manner in countries 
so as to diminish sources of competitive inequality 
which are derived from divergent national regula- 
tions? 3 More recently it has been understood that 
capital adequacy is only one of a number of factors to 
be taken into account when assessing the soundness 
and stability of banks. Therefore, in 1997, the Basle 
Committee issued the Basle Core Principles for Effec- 
tive Supervision. They contain 25 principles covering 
all the major areas of banking and are the most 
comprehensive international standards to date. They 
are expected to be endorsed by all bank supervisors 
by the end of 1998. The BIS has, until very recently, 
been preoccupied almost exclusively with the affairs 
of industrialised countries. But since 1996 it has been 
gradually opening up to emerging market economies. 
The International Monetary Fund 
A survey of capital controls existing in the devel- 
oping countries at the end of 1993 showed that of the 
155 members of the IMF, 25 per cent had free 
movement of capital. These results must be taken 
22 See Bank For international Settlements: Profile of an International 
Organisation, June 1998, http://www.bis.org. 
with some caution as countries are not obliged to give 
full information to the IMF on their capital account 
liberalisation. Many developing countries use the 
'positive list approach' which means that they report 
only on transactions which are freely allowed. In other 
developing countries capital controls are not specific- 
ally reported but are included in a general statement 
of declaration of capital account restrictions. 
The International Monetary Fund does not have 
competence for capital account liberalisation? 4Article 
VI of the Articles of Agreement permits countries to 
impose and maintain capital controls for balance of 
payments reasons and exchange rate stability. 
However the IMF has a mandate for surveillance 
(Article IV, Section 3(b)) of member countries' policies 
and can exercise influence through this activity in 
consultations which take place on an annual basis. 
Generally, the IMF has restricted its policy recom- 
mendations to obliging member countries to liberalise 
current account transactions, discriminatory currency 
practices and convertibility of foreign held balances in 
line with Article VIII. 
In its consultations with developing countries the 
IMF has taken a case-by-case approach with respect 
to capital account liberalisation. Generally, the IMF 
has supported a gradual approach to capital account 
liberalisation and is against using capital controls for 
balance of payments difficulties. But the IMF has delib- 
erately refrained from an activist policy of advocating 
capital account liberalisation in developing countries. 
The exception has been the countries of central and 
eastern Europe where liberalisation of capital move- 
ments was strongly urged as a means of achieving 
significant liberalisation of FDI. 
However, the original role assigned to the IMF 
under the Bretton Woods agreement has been over- 
taken by events. Following the demise of the fixed 
exchange rate regime and the subsequent growth of 
private international capital flows, its role has evolved 
over time. The IMF's mandate on surveillance was 
expanded by a decision taken in 1977 when the 
Executive Board made a decision on exchange rate 
surveillance which includes provisions for dealing with 
capital controls. In 1995 the surveillance mandate of 
the IMF was further amended at the Biennial Review 
~ For a critical evaluation of the Bas~e Accord see M. J. B. Hal l :  
The BIS Capital Adequacy "Rules": A Critique, in: Banca Naziona~e 
Del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 169, June 1989, pp. 207-229. 
~4 See Ch. IV: Experience with Capital Account Liberalization in 
Developing Countries, in: Capital Account Convertibility Review of 
Experience and Implications for IMF Policies, op. cit. 
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in order to take into account the reality of increasing 
financial integration and private capital flows. In 
September 1997, the IMF took a big step forward at 
its annual meeting in Hong Kong where it issued a 
statement virtually endorsing the move towards 
capital account convertibility. 
The World Trade Organisation 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, an agreement on 
the liberalisation of trade in financial services was 
concluded under the framework of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The first 
interim agreement was in place between 1995-97 with 
the conspicuous absence of the United States - albeit 
the most vociferous demandeur of the agreement? ~ In 
December 1997, however, a global agreement on 
trade in financial services was signed by 102 
countries - including the United States which signaled 
the achievement of greater liberalisation than in the 
previous agreement. 
The Agreement has very wide coverage. Financial 
services are defined as any service of a financial 
nature offered by a financial service supplier of a 
member. The full list of financial services (which is 
given in Appendix 2 of the Annex to the agreement) 
shows that all financial transactions are covered by 
this agreement. 
The Agreement defines four modes of supply for 
financial services. One, cross-border supply where 
consumers or financial institutions in one country are 
free to take loans or purchase securities from banks in 
another country. Two, consumption abroad where 
consumers in one country are free to open accounts 
and deposit money in banks in another country. 
Three, commercial presence, where foreign banks 
establish subsidiaries or branches in a foreign country 
and offer financial services directly in that country. 
Four, movement of natural persons where personnel 
linked to the provision of financial services are free to 
move across borders. 
The framework of the GATS for the liberalisation of 
financial services is composed of three parts. The first 
part consists of general rules based on well-known 
trade principles The general obligations of countries 
under these rules are most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment of trading partners (Article II) and trans- 
parency with regard to its national regulations (Article 
HI). The second part consists of national schedules of 
market access and national treatment commitments. 
This is where the real liberalisation takes place. 
Specific obligations of countries relate to market 
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opening for foreign suppliers (Article XVI) and national 
treatment for foreign suppliers in the case of estab- 
lishment (Article XVII). These market opening offers 
are inscribed in the Schedules of commitments of 
countries and are listed in the form of limitations or 
measures applicable. 
The commitments made under modes one, two 
and three are dependent on the free movement of 
capital. Therefore the Agreement implies the need for 
partial liberalisation of the capital account. However, 
countries may introduce restrictions on capital flows, 
which could affect their liberalisation commitments, 
for balance of payments reasons under Article Xll of 
the Agreement. But these restrictions are subject to 
consultation in the WTO committee on balance of 
payments. The IMF plays a similar role as for trade 
restrictions by providing a report assessing the 
country's situation with respect to financial reserves. 
The Annex to the Agreement contains a prudential 
carve-out. Countries are granted a large measure of 
discretion with respect to prudential regulation and no 
consultations on these measures are required in the 
WTO. 
Thus we see that the liberalisation of capital 
movements and financial services, together with the 
establishment of standards for prudential regulation 
and supervision of banks, was coordinated among 
industrial countries. For developing countries there 
was no such coordination. The IMF has a rather 
ambiguous status with respect to the liberalisation of 
capital movements while the WTO, which has no 
competence in capital account liberalisation, addres- 
ses the issue indirectly through the liberalisation of 
trade in financial services. The prudential carve-out in 
the GATS agreement leaves developing countries to 
their own devices in matters of prudential regulation 
and supervision of banking. A future MAI will have to 
take measures to correct the institutional failures 
which have become exposed in the wake of the Asian 
crisis. 
International Investment Rules 
and the Global Financial System 
Negotiations for international investment rules so 
far have been conducted between a limited group of 
like-minded countries in the OECD. What the Asian 
crisis has shown is that flawed financial sectors in 
~' For an analysis of the first Agreement see P. Sorsa :  The GATS 
Agreement on Financial Services - A Modest Start to Multilateral 
Liberalisation, IMF Working Paper WP/97/55, Washington D.C. 1997. 
See also the study published by the WTO entitled Opening Markets 
in Financial Services and the Role of the GATS, Geneva 1997. 
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developing countries and inadequate risk assessment 
by international creditors and investors can have 
negative effects throughout the global economy. 
Therefore, what is needed is a truly global MAI where 
developing countries are brought on board as active 
negotiators. The goal of such a MAI implies the need 
for existing international institutions to adapt to the 
more complex realities involved in the liberalisation of 
investment and capital flows than was hitherto 
imagined. The three international institutions which 
need to cooperate towards achieving a global MAI are 
the WTO, the BIS and the IME 
The major work of the WTO to date has been trade 
liberalisation. But it has now become involved in the 
liberalisation of investment as well as trade in financial 
services and, hence, in the liberalisation of capital 
flows, through the GATS agreement. Other issues 
Figure 1 
Architecture of the Global Financial System 
Global rules for liberalisation 
of financial services and capital flows 
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related to investment have been opened up under the 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agree- 
ment and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) Agreement under the Uruguay Round. 
Therefore, the WTO, with a membership of 132 coun- 
tries, is the appropriate negotiating forum for liberalis- 
ing investment and capital flows. 
The BIS should expand its role in strengthening 
national financial systems. Because a banking crisis in 
one country can have negative spill-over effects on 
other countries there is need for a systematic 
approach to the supervision of domestic banking 
systems. The instruments already developed by the 
BIS will need to be expanded to cover a wider range 
of areas including, inter alia, accounting standards, 
full corporate governance systems, bankruptcy regi- 
mes etc. The BIS and the WTO will need to cooperate 
much more closely as the 'prudential carve out' of the 
current GATS agreement on financial services 
presents a threat to the global financial system. 
The IMF should expand its traditional surveillance 
of macroeconomic policies to include banking 
systems. Using its Special Data Dissemination Stand- 
ards, the IMF shoutd require governments to provide 
full information on central banks and commercial 
banks in order to assess the overall health of the 
financial sector, tn this way the IMF can foster better 
disclosure of financial data not only from the public 
sector but also from private economic agents. This 
information should be regularly published by the IMF. 
The best means of surveillance lies in maximising 
transparency all round so that early warning signals of 
impending crises can be signaled. 
Our proposal for their role in strengthening the 
architecture of the global financial system through 
better cooperation between the three institutions is 
portrayed in Figure 1. 
Conclusions 
The negotiation of a global MAI presents an 
opportunity for achieving the necessary restructuring 
of international economic institutions in order to 
strengthen the architecture of the global financial 
system. This calls for adaptation and closer 
cooperation between the trade and financial institu- 
tions - the WTO, the BIS and the IME There is need 
for joint implementation of rules for the liberalisation 
of investment and capital flows, harmonised stand- 
ards for prudential regulation and supervision and 
comprehensive surveillance of macroeconomic stabi- 
lisation policy and microeconomic banking policy. 
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